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Australian governments are the primary investors, infrastructure owners and operators in the 
Australian water sector. Population growth, historic underinvestment in water infrastructure,1 
water security, climate change and increasing environmental and public health regulation mean 
that considerable investment in the sector is needed in the future. Significant capital expenditure 
is required to renew ageing assets and expand networks. 2  
Given the challenging fiscal environment for governments in the short to medium term, now is 
an opportune time for governments to consider where public investment in the water sector is 
most needed, where efficiency gains can be made and whether additional private investment in 
the sector could usefully free up current public investment for application in other sectors such 
as health and education.  
This paper examines a number of the regulatory barriers to greater private sector participation 
in the sector. It includes a set of recommendations to governments to facilitate increased private 
sector investment in the short term and broader reform in the medium to long term.  
2. The role of regulatory frameworks in the water sector 
For good reason, the water sector is highly regulated. The extraction, ownership, storage, 
trading, treatment, transportation, use, supply and discharge of water and wastewater is subject 
to predominantly state-based legislative regimes although the Commonwealth is starting to 
encroach on this with the regulation of the Murray Darling Basin in the Water Act 2007 (Cth), 
and the water trigger for large mines and coal seam gas in the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Act 1999 (Cth). The overarching purpose of much of the legislation is to ensure that 
Australians have access to a safe, secure and environmentally sustainable water supply for 
human consumption as well as domestic, agricultural and industrial uses and maintaining 
environmental flows. 
With some notable exceptions, the current regulatory frameworks were designed around a 
water sector in which governments are responsible for almost all aspects of water supply and 
wastewater collection, treatment and disposal.3  
Over time there has been a move away from governments being solely responsible for policy 
formulation, regulation and monopoly service delivery in the water sector. Most of the states and 
territories now have discrete public health, environmental and economic regulatory frameworks 
that can readily be used to govern activities by a range of participants in the water sector. In 
many parts of the water sector, however, there is not a complete institutional separation of 
service providers from the regulatory and policy functions of governments. This can create 
barriers to the promotion of customer choice and community involvement, innovation, efficiency 
and private sector investment in the water sector. 
The governance arrangements of most public water utilities (including those which are 
corporatised) still enable the government to exercise significant influence over their operations, 
                                                                
1 PwC 2010, Review of Urban Water Security Strategies, Sydney, page 9. 
2 See by way of example Austrade, Investment opportunities in Australian infrastructure, June 2014 and 
the Local Government Infrastructure Audit 2013 published by the NSW Division of Local Government, 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 2013 regarding the water supply, sewer network and stormwater 
drainage infrastructure backlogs. 
3 The Water Industry Competition Act 2006 in NSW is a serious attempt to provide a regulatory framework 
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corporate overhead costs and reducing efficiency through less effective coordination of 
services.  
Challenges to introducing competition in the market 
While competition has successfully been introduced into the supply of a number of essential 
services in Australia (including electricity), water has a number of characteristics that 
differentiate it from other essential services: 
 the supply of water and wastewater services are intimately connected to human health 
and survival; 
 there are considerable externalities associated with the water sector;11 
 the composition and quality of raw water varies considerably depending on its source as 
opposed to electricity which is fairly consistent once generated;  
 the need to maintain environmental flows; and 
 there are very few substitution possibilities. 
The water sector is sometimes regarded as a natural monopoly industry "par excellence" where 
the potential for competition amongst different suppliers is assessed to be limited. Regulation is 
viewed as a permanent requirement of the water and wastewater industry, not a temporary 
stage in the transition to a competitive supply structure.12 
As a consequence, the most common structure is the integration of all or some water supply 
activities within a single operator or company with three basic models: 
 public operator model, where the state owns and operates -the model used in Australia; 
 the French model, in which assets are publicly owned, but management and operation of 
the assets is undertaken by private entities under medium to long term concession 
contracts awarded by a competitive bidding process; and 
 the UK model in which there is private ownership and operation of the assets associated 
with water and wastewater supply. 
Water transportation networks, and in particular distribution networks, are almost always natural 
monopolies. In theory, an access regime should enable a third party to be responsible for the 
procurement, treatment and retail supply of water but use the network of the incumbent supplier 
to transport the water from its source to the point of delivery. However in practice, third party 
access regimes alone have not been sufficient to drive new entry into the sector. The one water 
industry specific access regime in Australia13 has only resulted in small rather than material 
increases in private sector participation in the sector so far. 14 Similarly, the generic third party 
access regime under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) which applies to services 
                                                                
11 For example, poor maintenance of distribution systems can have public health implications and the 
quality of water abstracted at specific points in a river basin can be affected by the level of abstraction 
that occurs further upstream, as well as any effluent or waste introduced into the river system upstream. 
12 Page 360, Modern Economic Regulation, Christopher Decker, Cambridge University Press, 2015. See 
also the comment at page 386 that restructuring policies in the UK are generally not seen as having been 
successful in relation to the development of competition. 
13 The Water Industry (Third Party Access) Amendment Bill 2015 is currently before the South Australian 
Parliament to introduce a third party access regime into the Water Act 2012 (SA). 
14 For a list of the type of investments that have been undertaken pursuant to the regime, see page 5 of 
'Embracing Competition: 'The Sydney Experience', IWA/AWA Conference – Enhancing Water Sector 




provided by facilities of national significance has not produced any meaningful new entry in the 
sector.15 
Potential opportunities for competition 
There is the potential for competition in the supply of bulk water, water treatment and 
wastewater treatment. For example: 
 multiple bulk water suppliers in a given area or region, which compete to sell water to a 
distribution company, whether that takes the form of separate operators of different 
catchments or other sources, or in the form of bulk water supply entitlements in the 
same sources, each bidding to supply distributors in a competitive market; or 
 competition between different operators as well as private sector provision of water and 
wastewater treatment by way of outsourcing contracts or longer-term concession 
agreements with public water utilities. 
There are already multiple wastewater treatment facilities being operated by private entities on 
behalf of government owned water utilities, and private entities have been involved in their 
design and construction and finance. There is the potential to move from the current competitive 
outsourcing model to one in which these assets are separated from water utilities. 
Taking the further step of putting the facilities in private hands, and removing the cost of their 
construction and maintenance from government balance sheets, may have several benefits:  
 Transferring to the private sector the risk of increasing environmental standards for 
discharge wastewater quality also requires more expensive technology, which is both 
difficult to fund and technologically challenging to install and operate.16  
 Private sector owner/operators could be contracted to provide wastewater treatment 
facilities, and the contracts themselves can be used as a means of regulating the 
operation of the facilities, including discharge standards meaning that the separation of 
existing wastewater treatment facilities could potentially be undertaken in a manner that 
requires minimal regulatory reform. 
 The initial sale of existing wastewater facilities would generate cash for debt repayment 
or capital recycling opportunities. 
 The need to pay an arm's length contract rate to private owner/operators for the 
provision of wastewater services would represent a step towards the NWI objective of 
achieving water service pricing that transparently reflects the full cost of water service 
provision. 
 Contract arrangements with private owner/operators could be structured so as to 
achieve cost savings through efficiency and innovation. For example, even under a cost-
plus service contract that limits the ultimate cost of service to the customer, contractual 
'gain-share/pain-share' mechanisms could be used to encourage private 
owner/operators to adopt new technologies and methodologies with assurance that they 
will participate in any long run cost reductions. 
 The incentives for efficiency and innovation are stronger for businesses operating in a 
competitive environment. The ability to own multiple wastewater treatment facilities may 
                                                                
15 Under Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), access to sewage transmission and 
interconnection service provided by infrastructure owned by Sydney Water were declared subject to 
access regulation, and a separate application to declare water storage and transport services provided by 
Snowy Hydro Ltd and State Water was rejected, following the recommendation of the National 
Competition Council. See www.ncc.gov.au for the applications and final determinations. 
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5. Independent Economic Regulation 
Every state and territory in Australia has an independent economic regulator.19 Each of those 
regulators has some level of responsibility for the regulation of the water sector in its own 
jurisdiction. However, the existence of an independent economic regulator and independent 
economic regulation are not the same thing.  
Water prices are still determined by Government Ministers in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory. In Queensland they are determined by the public water utilities with the 
Queensland Competition Authority undertaking price monitoring. In South Australia, ESCOSA 
must comply with any direction of the Treasurer in making a price determination,20 and in NSW 
the Minister can set the terms of reference for certain IPART price determinations.21 In Victoria, 
the Minster sets the method of regulation by way of pricing order. 
It is critical that participants in the water sector can have confidence in the independence of 
economic regulatory decisions given their importance to an entity's operation and the 
governments' position as the incumbent infrastructure owners, operators and policy makers in 
the water sector.  
In the absence of competition, economic regulation should provide incentives such that the 
owner of the assets delivers water at an efficient cost and price that allows it to stay in business, 
make a reasonable profit and keep investing. That regulation must also provide a degree of 
assurance that permits investors to commit to projects with limited risk of a significant change in 
the regulatory environment with changes in governments or their policies. 
An independent regulatory agency is one that has a degree of autonomy from government, is 
not under the direct control of politicians or the government and is responsible for pursuing 
specific goals and objectives.22 It is regarded as evidence of a government's commitment to 
restrict interference in the regulated sector. The regulator makes decisions based on defined 
objectives and goals and not the short term objectives of the government of the day.  
Private sector participants need to have confidence in the rules of regulation, and that these 
rules are and will be consistently applied to all participants, whether publicly or privately owned.  
One way to ensure the regulator is independent from state and territory governments is to have 
a national regulator applying a national economic regulatory framework. Such an approach 
would be consistent with the recommendations of the Harper Review. The review 
recommended that a new Access and Pricing Regulator be established if a national approach 
were to be adopted.23 A national regulator could also be in a better position to obtain information 
to implement forms of economic regulation which compared the performance of water utilities 
across the country such as benchmarking. 
                                                                
19 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW), Essential Services Commission (Victoria), the 
Queensland Competition Authority, Essential Services Commission of South Australia (SA), the Utilities 
Commission (Northern Territory), the Economic Regulation Authority (WA), the Independent Competition 
and Regulatory Commission (ACT) and the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator (Tas). 
20 Section 35 of the Water Industry Act 2012 (SA). 
21 See for example, the Minister's terms of reference to IPART with respect to the Sydney Desalination 
Plant pursuant to section 52 of the Water Industry Competition Act 2006 (NSW). 
22 Page 189,Modern Economic Regulation, Christopher Decker, Cambridge University Press, 2015. . 




However, regardless of whether the relevant regulator is national or state-based, real 
independent economic regulation of water requires the state and territory governments to agree 
to relinquish the right to directly influence water pricing determinations other than through 
determining the form of economic regulation. This is an absolutely critical first step to promoting 
further private investment in the sector.  
The Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) has proposed a national urban water 
agreement be put in place through COAG to provide clear minimum and agreed standards for 
economic regulation to be met in all jurisdictions, including the need for regulation which is 
independent from governments.24 
To be effective, any such minimum standards regarding independence should at least require 
that: 
 the economic regulatory framework is a statutory one put in place by government that 
clearly articulates: 
- the basis upon which the independent economic regulator will make its decision; 
and  
- the overarching objective of the regulation to promote economically efficient water 
use and service provision in the long term interests of end user; 
 the economic regulatory framework should be designed to promote consistent and 
predictable decision-making over time by the independent economic regulator; 
 an independent economic regulator determines prices (as opposed to a government 
agency or Minister) in accordance with a statutory framework that does not enable the 
government on an ad hoc basis to confine the scope of the independent economic 
regulator's ability to make a determination (for example by prescribing terms of 
reference, maximum prices, the rate of return, mandate that the full cost of an inefficient 
capital investment be included in a regulated entity's regulatory asset base or give other 
directions that constrain the regulator's discretion to make a decision); and 
 the independent economic regulator's price determination should be subject to review by 
a competent independent body, such as the Australian Competition Tribunal. 
Similar principles should apply to the oversight of prices in non-metropolitan and rural systems, 
which should not be determined by local councils or government without adequate oversight by 
an independent economic regulator (although a more light-handed form of regulation may be 
more appropriate). 
This is such an important reform that it may be one which the Commonwealth Government 
would consider worthy of an incentive funding scheme for state and territory governments that 
adopt it. Strengthening economic regulation in urban water and creating incentives for increased 
private participation in the sector through improved pricing practices was one of the Harper 
Review's recommendations for the water sector.25 
Closely linked to independent regulation, is the reform of water pricing. Again, this is an area in 
which state and territory governments need to decide whether the current approaches to pricing 
are in the long term interest of consumers, or whether consumers' interests may be better 
served by pricing methodologies that focus on promoting consumer choice, promoting 
infrastructure investment and avoiding long-term price shocks rather than focusing solely on 
uniform low prices. 
                                                                
24 WSAA, Better Regulation for Customers, August 2014. 
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About this paper 
This paper was prepared at the request of the Australian Water Association. It focuses on the 
regulation of the water sector and identifies potential issues arising out of variations and 
discrepancies across economic, health and environment regulation of the water sector across 
Australian jurisdictions.  
Katrina and Brendan met with many interested participants in the water sector for their input, 
and overlayed their own perspective and experience to provide a platform for further 
discussions about the future of the water industry in Australia, including suggested areas that 
require harmonisation, the potential role of a national regulator and potential changes needed to 
facilitate investments into the water sector by private investors. 
They look forward to presenting their findings at Ozwater’15, and being part of the continuing 
discussions. 
 
